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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 VIENNA 5228

FROM US MBFR REP

E. O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR: BELGIAN VIEWS ON CONDUCT OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECORDS DETAILS OF CONVERSATION BY US REP MBFR ON JUNE 20 IN BRUSSELS WITH BELGIAN OFFICIALS DAVIGNON, DESTAERCKE AND ADRIAENSSEN CONCERNING BELGIAN VIEWS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE VIENNA TALKS AND OF PENDING MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. US REP HAS ALREADY MADE AN ORAL REPORT ON THESE TALKS TO USNATO AND EMBASSY BRUSSELS. DURING THESE CONVERSATIONS, BELGIAN OFFICIALS STATED QUITE OPENLY THAT THEY HAD DELIBERATELY STAGED A SCENE WITH REGARD TO VIENNA PROCEDURES HAVING IN MIND WIDER OBJECTIVES THAN THE VIENNA TALKS. THEY ADVANCED SEVERAL SUGGESTIONS ABOUT CONDUCT OF PENDING MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SEEM REASONABLE AND MIGHT BE WORTH FOLLOWING UP, POSSIBLY WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING
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THEY ARE INCLUDED IN SUITABLE LANGUAGE IN A PAPER WHICH BELGIANS ARE PREPARING ON NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES AND WHICH THEY OFFERED TO SHOW USNATO OFFICERS. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING VISIT OF US REP TO BRUSSELS ON JUNE 20-21, US REP MET WITH BELGIAN NATO PERMREP DESTAERCKE AND BELGIAN MBFR REP ADRIAENSSEN ON AFTERNOON OF JUNE 20 AT THE INITIATIVE AND INVITATION OF ADRIAENSSEN. US REP SUGGESTED DISCUSSION SHOULD NOT RAKE OVER THE PAST BUT FOCUS ON MEANS OF ENSURING THAT MBFR NEGOTIATIONS MOVED SMOOTHLY IN THE PROCEDURAL SENSE. DESTAERCKE SAID HE WISHED AT THE OUTSET TO EMPHASIZE THAT THERE WAS NO PERSONAL ELEMENT WHATEVER IN BELGIAN COMPLAINTS ABOUT WORK METHODS IN VIENNA. BELGIAN AUTHORITIES REALIZED US REP HAD CARRIED MAIN BURDEN OF WORK IN VIENNA AND CONSIDERED HE HAD DONE EXCELLENT JOB. SPEAKING FRANKLY, DE STAERCKE SAID BELGIANS HAD DELIBERATELY "CREATED A SCENE" WITH TWO OBJECTIVES IN MIND. FIRST, THEY HAD WISHED TO FOCUS NATO ATTENTION ON WORKING METHODS FOR THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS PROPER. HERE THE PROBLEM AS HE SAW IT WAS THAT BELGIAN OFFICIALS COULD NOT ADEQUATELY PERFORM THEIR FUNCTION OF COPING WITH OFFICIAL, PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION IN BELGIUM, IF THE ONLY ROLE THEY PLAYED IN VIENNA WAS THAT OF AN ANONYMOUS MEMBER OF THE AD HOC GROUP. VIEWED OBJECTIVELY, SUCH A ROLE MIGHT GIVE BELGIANS THE DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST ON MBFR. BUT IT WOULD NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF A SITUATION WHERE THE FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS HAD TO SHOW THE BELGIAN MILITARY, FROM WHOM THERE HAD BEEN INCREASING PRESSURES RECENTLY, THAT THE FORMER KNEW WHAT THEY WERE DOING, WERE IN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION AS FAR AS THEY COULD BE, AND WERE PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN VIENNA.

3. DESTAERCKE SAID THE SAME CONSIDERATION APPLIED WITH REGARD TO THE POSITION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE POSITION VIS- A- VIS THE BELGIAN PARLIAMENT. AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPER DEVELOPED, THE BELGIAN FOREIGN OFFICE WOULD TO BE IN A POSITION WHERE IT HAD TO MAKE PALATABLE TO THE PARLIAMENT ITS AGREEMENT TO FOLLOW THE US POSITION THAT MAIN EMPHASIS IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE TALKS SHOULD BE ON REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCES, WITH TREATMENT OF NATIONAL FORCES POSTPONED FOR A LATER STAGE. BELGIAN OFFICIALS COULD NOT CONVINCINGLY SELL THIS POSITION TO THE PARLIAMENT AND TO THE BELGIAN PUBLIC IN ADDITION IF THEY COULD NOT BE SEEN VISIBLY TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE

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IN VIENNA.

4. DESTAERCKE SAID THE SECOND BELGIAN MOTIVE FOR THE RECENT "EPISODE" HAD BEEN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. IT HAD BEEN A DESIRE TO HELP THE US OBTAIN FROM THE SOVIETS FULFILLMENT OF THE SOVIET PLEDGE TO HOLD THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER TIME FRAME. WHEN ADRIAENSSEN HAD REPORTED FROM VIENNA THAT THE SOVIETS WERE RESISTING PUTTING ANY SPECIFIC DATE INTO THE COMMUNIQUE, DESTAERCKE HAD IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE ALLIES WERE FACED BY A CRISIS AND BELGIUM SHOULD HELP BY STAGING A DRAMA. THIS HAD BEEN THE REASON FOR BELGIAN OPPOSITION TO CONTINUATION OF WORK IN VIENNA ON THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE, A TEXT WHICH HE FOUND

INTRINSICALLY QUITE ACCEPTABLE AND EVEN GOOD, AND FOR BELGIAN INSISTENCE THAT FURTHER NEGOTIATION IN VIENNA TAKE THE FORM OF PLENARIES FOCUSED SOLELY ON BANGING AWAY AT THE DATE. DESTAERCKE SAID HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS HAD MISSED A GOOD BET IN NOT COMING THROUGH WITH A CHANGED POSITION ON THE DATE FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE COPENHAGEN NATO MINISTERIAL. IF THEY HAD, THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE MINISTERIAL WOULD HAVE BEEN ALL SWEETNESS AND LIGHT TOWARDS SOVIET DETENTE POLICY AND THE CSCE. BUT IN ANY EVENT, THE BELGIANS HAD FELT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE ISSUE OF THE DATE WAS NOT ONLY A BILATERAL MATTER BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIETS, BUT A CONCERN SHARED BY THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE.

5. US REP REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, POINTING OUT THAT THE HUNGARIAN PROBLEM HAD PREVENTED PLENARIES AND THAT AFTER THE HUNGARIAN PROBLEM WAS SOLVED THERE HAD BEEN UNDERSTANDABLE TIME PRESSURE FROM NAC AND NATIONAL CAPITALS TO CONCLUDE THE TALKS RAPIDLY, NECESSITATING SOME ACTIVE TACTICS TO MOVE THE SOVIETS FROM A DISCUSSION OF AGENDA TO THAT OF COMMUNIQUE. THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE DIFFERENT. THERE WOULD BE MORE PLENARIES AND MORE WORKING GROUPS. US REP EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT THERE HAD BEEN A COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTY ON THE BELGIAN SIDE BETWEEN VIENNA AND BRUSSELS. THE BELGIAN REP HAD CHANGED FOUR DIFFERENT TIMES AND FOR TWO-THIRDS OF THE TIME THERE HAD BEEN NO SECOND BELGIAN OFFICIAL TO BACK HIM UP. THE BELGIAN DELEGATION HAD BEEN NUMERICALLY THE SMALLEST DELEGATION OF ANY REPRESENTED IN VIENNA, INCLUDING THE FLANKS AND PORTUGAL, WHO HAD ALL HAD AT LEAST ONE BACKUP

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OFFICER TO DO THE REPORTING. BOTH DESTAERCKE AND ADRIAENSSEN AGREED THAT THIS HAD INDEED BEEN A PROBLEM. DESTAERCKE SAID ADRIAENSSEN SHOULD INSIST TO THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THAT HE HAVE ADEQUATE MANPOWER OR HE COULD NOT UNDERTAKE ASSIGNMENT AS FAR AS NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONCERNED.

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FROM US MBFR REP

6. US REP POINTED OUT THAT, WITH BELGIAN INTERSTS IN MIND, HE HAD THAT MORNING RESPONDED WHEN SOVIETS HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF PLENARIES, CLAIMING THAT THE ALLIES HAD BEEN WILLING TO FOREGO THEM AND THAT PLENARIES SHOULD ONLY RATIFY WORKDONE IN SMALLER WORK GROUPS, THAT PLENARIES SHOULD BE HELD WHENEVER EITHER EAST OR WEST DESIRED THEM. US REP SAID SOVIETS HAD APPEARED ON THIS OCCASION TO BE RECEPTIVE TO THIS CONCEPT. DESTAERCKE AND ADRIAENSSEN EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THIS PROGRESS. COMMENT: HOWEVER, BELGIAN REP IN AD HOC GROUP SUBSEQUENTLY OBJECTED ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS TO THIS DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS.

7 US REP SAID PLENARIES AND WORKING GROUPS WERE USEFUL AS A WAY OF DEVELOPING SUBJECT MATTER, BUT WHEN THE STAGE OF DECISION ON ANY GIVEN TOPIC WAS REACHED DURING THR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE DRAFTING IN A SMALLER GROUP. THIS WOULD HAVE TO INVOLVE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS SHOWED MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY WHEN ALONE AND LEAST FLEXIBILITY IN PLENARIES. US REP POINTED
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OUT THAT HE HAD MADE A DELIBERATE EFFORT TO AVOID BILATERALS WITH SOVIETS BUT LATTER HAD HABIT OF SEEKING OUT US REP. THE SMAL EMISSARY GROUP OF TWO OR THREE REPS SEEMED THE BEST WAY OF MEETING BOTH TECHNICAL NEEDS OF NEGOTIATION AND THIS POLITICAL PROBLEM.

8. DESTAERCKE SAID HE BELIEVED HE SAW ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. AS HE SAW IT, TWO MAIN REQUIREMENTS WERE INVOLVED FOR THE ALLIES. ON THE ONE HAND THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING EFFICIENCY. ON THE OTHER, THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL VISIBILITY AND CAPACITY TO AFFECT PUBLIC OPINION WHICH WAS MOST ACUTE FOR THE SMALLER PARTICIPANTS. THESE REQUIREMENTS HAD TO BE BALANCED IN SOME SUITABLE MIX DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. US REP SAID HE WOULD SUBSCRIBE TO THIS DEFINITION. DESTAERCKE SAID THE BELGIANS WERE PREPARING APAPER ON NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SET FORTH THE VIEW THAT PLENARIES SHOULD BE HELD WHENEVER EITHER SIDE DESIRED, THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE PLACE PERHAPS AT LEAST ONCE EVERY TWO WEEKS, EVEN IF THE CONTENT WAS ALRGELY STAGED, THAT PLENARIES SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE PARENT BODY OF THE WHOLE NEGOTIATIONS IN THAT NEW CONCEPTS AND PROPOSALS SHOULD BE INTRODUCED FIRST IN THE PLENARIES AND THAT ANY

WORKING GROUPS OR EMISSARIES WHICH APPEARED NEEDED SHOULD BE DECIDED UPON BY THE PLENARIES THEMSELVES. DESTAERCKE REITERATED THAT HE ACCEPTED THERE WAS A NEED FOR USE OF THE EMISSARY SYSTEM AT CERTAIN POINTS IN NEGOTIATIONS. US REP SAID THAT SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE BELIEVED HE COULD FOLLOW MOST POINTS OF DESTAERCKE'S APPROACH, ALTHOUGH IT COULD ALREADY BE SEEN THAT THEY COULD ADD MATERIALLY TO THE WORK LOAD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ADRIAENSSEN PROPOSED THAT US OFFICIALS BE GIVEN A LOOK AT THE CURRENT BELGIAN PAPER PRIOR TO ITS SUBMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND COULD MAKE SUGGESTIONS AS TO ITS CONTENTS IF THEY WISHED.

9. DESTAERCKE SAID THAT HE WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME MORE FREQUENT PERSONAL VISITS OF PRESENT TYPE BY US REP OR US NEGOTIATOR DURING NEGOTIATIONS AND ALSO MORE FREQUENT ORGANIZED REPORTS BY MEMBERS OF AD HOC GROUP TO THE COUNCIL. THIS WOULD GIVE THE COUNCIL FEELING OF HAVING SOME REAL CONTROL OVER SITUATION, AND ALSO AVOID SITUATIONS IN WHICH COUNCIL DID NOT ACT EFFECTIVELY BECAUSE OF LACK OF INFORMATION. DESTAERCKE REITERATED THAT BELGIAN CRITICISMS AGAINST VIENNA PROCEDURES HAD NOT BEEN OF A PERSONAL NATURE.

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10. IN A SEPARATE, SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH DAVIGNON AND ADRIAENSSEN, US REP AGAIN SAID HIS MAIN INTEREST WAS IN TRYING TO WORK UP PROCEDURES FOR FUTURE RATHER THAN REVIEWING THE PAST. HE REPEATED HIS POINT ABOUT STRONGER NUMERICAL BELGIAN REPRESENTATION AT VIENNA. DAVIGNON AGREED THIS PROBLEM EXISTED BUT SAID IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE IT. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION, US REP SAID HIS MAIN PERSONAL OBJECTIONS WAS THAT THE RECENT BELGIAN PUBLICITY OFFENSIVE AND WALK-OUT FROM THE AD HOC GROUP HAD BEEN LAUNCHED WITHOUT WARNING TO OTHER ALLIES. AGAIN SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE DID NOT CONSIDER THIS MODE OF PROCEEDING TO BE ESPECIALLY COMPATIBLE WITH AN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP. US REP POINTED OUT THAT, IN AD HOC GROUP AS IN OTHER MULTILATERAL FORA, ALL NATIONAL REPS WERE CONTINUALLY RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR AUTHORITIES ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS AND PRESENTING THEM TO GROUP. IN SITUATIONS OF THIS KIND, WHEN A SPECIFIC ISSUE WAS VIEWED PARTICULARLY SERIOUSLY BY THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED IT WAS CUSTOMARY TO SIGNAL THIS IN SOME WAY TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES OF THE KIND WHICH HAD OCCURRED. THIS HAD NOT BEEN DONE IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE. DAVIGNON SAID HE WOULD AGREE THAT THERE WAS SOME SUBSTANCE IN THIS CRITICISM, ALTHOUGH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE WARNED US OFFICIALS A WEEK BEFORE BELGIANS LAUNCHED THEIR CAMPAIGN. HE BELIEVED ONE POSSIBLE ANSWER TO SUCH PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE WOULD BE IF EACH OF THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT, WHEN IT FELT STRONGLY ABOUT AN ISSUE TO SUSPEND FORWARD ACTION IN AD HOC GROUP IN DEALINGS WITH THE EAST IN ORDER TO PROVIDE TIME FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF ITS VIEWS WITHIN THE GROUP. IF, EVEN AFTER THIS, A MAJORITY FELT THAT PREVIOUS COURSE WAS THE CORRECT ONE, THEN THE BELGIANS WOULD NOT WISH TO BE IN A MINORITY OF ONE. THERE WAS NO POINT IN BEING RIGHT BUT IN A MINORITY OF ONE.

WORKING ALLIANCE, AND BELGIUM WOULD HAVE TO ACCEDE TO THE MAJORITY VIEW.

11. DAVIGNON SAID HE BELIEVED THERE SHOULD BE MORE VISITS

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BY MEMBERS OF AD HOC GROUP TO THE COUNCIL AS WELL AS MORE PRIVATE VISITS LIKE THAT OF US REP. HE OBSERVED THAT PART OF THE PROBLEM OF VIENNA CONSULTATIONS WAS THAT, AS IS OFTEN THE CASE IN NEGOTIATIONS, UNFORESEEN AND UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRED. SUCH EVENTS WOULD CAUSE CONFUSION IN A NATIONAL CAPITAL IN THE CASE OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE MULTILATERAL NATO COUNCIL, THIS DIFFICULTY WAS COMPOUNDED. IN SUCH CASES, THE STANDARD PROCEDURE SHOULD BE FOR AD HOC GROUP TO ANALYZE THE SITUATION AND IF POSSIBLE TO FORWARD A UNIFIED RECOMMENDATION ON HOW TO DEAL WITH IT, OR AT LEAST SOME REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES, TO THE COUNCIL. DAVIGNON SAID HE THOUGHT THAT IN ADDITION TO WORKING OUT A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR THE UNEXPECTED NEGOTIATING PROBLEM, THE AD HOC GROUP COULD IN SUCH CASES ALSO SEND A DELEGATION TO THE COUNCIL TO PRESENT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS IN PERSON. SUCH A VISIT BY OFFICIALS WHO WERE FULLY INFORMED ON THE DETAILS COULD GREATLY HELP THE COUNCIL TO COPE WITH THE NEW PROBLEM AND TO REACH A DECISION RAPIDLY, TELESOPING THE LENGTHY PERIODS OF CONSULTATION WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN BRUSSELS DURING THE VIENNA TALKS.

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12. IN SEPARATE, SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION, ADRIAENSSEN GAVE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND ON BELGIAN MOTIVATION. HE SAID BELGIANS, GIVEN PAST BELGIAN HISTORY AND PRESENT PROBLEMS OF COUNTRY, FELT A NEED PERIODICALLY TO REACT PUBLICLY TO THE IDEAS THAT THEIR FUTURE COULD BE DETERMINED BY BIG POWER DECISIONS OVER THEIR HEADS. MOREOVER, HE CONSIDERED THAT THERE WAS, IN BELGIAN OPINION AN IMPORTANT IF NOT CLEARLY ARTICULATED AND VISIBLE COMPONENT OF GAULLIST THOUGHT WHICH HE FELT HAD TO BE REASSURED PERIODICALLY BY ACTIONS BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.

13. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE SOME OF THE POINTS ABOVE MADE BY BELGIAN OFFICIALS MIGHT BE BUILT ON SUCCESSFULLY FOR FUTURE AND POSSIBLY INCORPORATED IN SUITABLE LANGUAGE, IF THEY ARE NOT ALREADY INCLUDED, IN THE DRAFT BELGIAN PAPER ON NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES, OR IN SOME FUTURE NATO DOCUMENT ON THE SUBJECT. AS WE HAVE REPORTED (VIENNA 4921), EXPERIENCE DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS SHOWS THAT THE SMALLER ALLIED DELEGATIONS ARE MORE INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES WHICH ENHANCE THEIR PERSONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS THAN THEY ARE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATING SUBSTANCE. BELGIAN REMARKS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION CONFIRM THIS CONCLUSION. ALTHOUGH THIS CIRCUMSTANCE IMPOSES A HEAVY TAX ON NEGOTIATING EFFICIENCY, IT IS PROBABLY REALISTIC TO TRY TO MEET IT AND TO AGREE TO PAY A FURTHER PRICE FOR ALLIED COHESION IN THE MBFR OPERATION.

14. THE POINTS IN QUESTION MIGHT INCLUDE DESTAERCKE'S IDEA THAT, IN ADDITION TO NEGOTIATING EFFICIENCY, VALID DOMESTIC POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN DEVISING NEGOTIATING METHODS. DESTAERCKE'S CONCEPT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF PLENARIES MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, IF IT IS PROPERLY AND FLEXIBLY WORDED SO THAT IT DOES NOT BECOME A STRAIGHT JACKET FOR THE NEGOTIATORS. IT SHOULD CONTAIN A SPECIFIC ENDORSEMENT OF THE EMISSARY SYSTEM. IN PRACTICE, GIVEN EASTERN NEGOTIATING METHODS, IT WILL NOT BE FEASIBLE WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF NEW CONCEPTS OR BRINGING ADDITIONAL RIGIDITY INTO THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION TO INTRODUCE NEW CONCEPTS INTO PLENARIES WITHOUT PRIOR GROUNDWORK WITH EAST. BELGIAN PROPOSALS ON USE OF PLENARIES AS FOCAL POINT AND PARENT BODY OF NEGOTIATION WOULD CONSIDERABLY INCREASE THE WORK LOAD OF THE LARGER ALLIED DELEGATIONS WHICH WILL IN PRACTICE HAVE TO DO THE PREPARATORY WORK FOR PLENARIES AND STEER IT THROUGH AD HOC GROUP. NONETHELESS, BELGIAN VIEWS ON NEED FOR IN-SECRET

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CREASED VISIBILITY WILL PROBABLY BE SHARED BY ALL ALLIED PARTICIPANTS EXCEPT UK, FRG AND US.

15. ON THE BASIS OF EXPERIENCE IN VIENNA, WE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO DAVIGNON'S FORMULATION THAT ANY ALLIANCE MEMBER COULD CALL A TEMPORARY HALT TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH OTHER SIDE BY REQUESTING FOR REVIEW WITHIN THE AD HOC GROUP OF DISPUTED ISSUES IF IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE COUNTRY CONCERNED WILL, AFTER SUCH A DISCUS-

SION, ACCEDE TO THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY. ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT OCCASION DELAYS FROM TIME TO TIME, THIS PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH DISSENT IS IMPLICIT IN THE CONCEPT OF THE AD HOC GROUP. IT IS THE CONTRARY OF WHAT THE BELGIANS HAVE ACTUALLY DONE IN RECENT OUTBREAK. GIVEN THE BACKGROUND OF BELGIAN POLITICS AND THE PERSONALITIES INVOLVED, FLASH FIRES OF THE KIND WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED IN THE VIENNA TALKS APPARENTLY CANNOT BE ELIMINATED. BUT THE EXISTENCE OF SOME AGREEMENT IN THE AD HOC GROUP THAT CONTENTIOUS ISSUES SHOULD BE DISPASSIONATELY DISCUSSED WOULD AT LEAST PROVIDE SOME WRITTEN STANDARD TO WHICH OTHER ALLIES MIGHT APPEAL WHEN THESE OCCURRENCES TAKE PLACE.

16. DAVIGNON'S SECOND VIEW ON HOW UNEXPECTED NEGOTIATING DIFFICULTIES WITH THE EAST SHOULD BE HANDLED ALSO CORRESPONDS TO THE LOGIC OF THE AD HOC GROUP CONCEPT WHICH WAS VIOLATED BY THE BELGIANS THEMSELVES IN FEBRUARY WHEN THEY BLOCKED CONSIDERATION BY THE GROUP OF ALTERNATIVES ON THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION AND INSTEAD FLOATED THEIR OWN ALTERNATIVE IN THE COUNCIL. AGAIN, EXISTENCE OF SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING IN WRITING WOULD NOT PREVENT ERRATIC BELGIAN BEHAVIOR, BUT MIGHT HELP IN COPING WITH IT.

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17. BOTH DAVIGNON AND DESTAERCKE REMARKED ON THE DESIRABILITY OF MORE VISITS BY DELEGATIONS FROM AD HOC GROUP TO COUNCIL. THERE HAD BEEN EVIDENCE THAT MANY AD HOC GROUP REPS ARE NOT REPORTING AS FULLY ON VIENNA PROCEEDINGS TO THEIR CAPITALS AND PERMREPS AS ARE THE FRG, UK AND US DELS. IN VIEW OF THIS, WE BELIEVE IT MAY BE USEFUL, AT LEAST AT THE OUTSET OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO PLAN

REGULAR VISITS BY AD HOC CHAIRMAN OF THE WEEK AND TWO OTHER REPS
EACH TWO WEEKS IF COUNCIL WILL ESTABLISH A REGULAR DAY AT BEGINN-
ING OR END OF WEEK ON WHICH THIS COULD TAKE PLACE. ALTHOUGH NE-
GOTIATORS AT THAT STAGE WILL BE PLENIPOTENTIARIES OF THEIR GOVERN-
MENTS, THEY WILL BE PRESENTING CORPORATE VIEWS OF THE GROUP RATH-
ER THAN NATIONAL VIEWPOINTS AND SHOULD IN OUR VIEW SIT TOGETHER
SEPARATELY AT THE COUNCIL TABLE. THIS WOULD ALSO SYMBOLIZE STATUS
OF GROUP AS AN ORGAN OF THE COUNCIL AND AID IN EFFECTIVENESS OF
PRESENTATION BY PERMITTING COORDINATION AMONG MEMBERS OF GROUP DE-
LEGATION DURING ITS PRESENTATION. WE FIND USEFUL DAVIGNON' S
VIEWS THAT PARTICULARLY AT TIMES WHEN THERE ARE NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEGOTIATIONS, A SPECIAL PERSONAL PRESENTATION OF GROUP RECOM-
MENDATIONS BY A DELEGATION FROM THE AD HOC GROUP MIGHT BE USEFUL
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